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This study examines the relation between corporate governance practices measured by 
Transparency Disclosure Index (TDI) and dividend policy in Poland. Our empirical approach 
constructs measures of the quality of the corporate governance for 110 non-financial companies 
listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2004. We find evidence that an increase in the 
TDI or its subindices leads to an increase in the dividend-to-cash-flow ratio. These results support 
the hypothesis that companies with weak shareholder rights pay dividends less generously than do 
firms with high corporate governance standards. Therefore, minority shareholders often use power 
to extract dividends. We also find that large and more profitable companies have a higher dividend 
payout ratio, while riskier and more indebted firms prefer to pay lower dividends. 
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Introduction 
The existing empirical literature often finds statistically controversial effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance and dividend policy in developed countries (Gompers et al., 
2003). In contrast, transition economies may offer more fertile ground for study, because they often 
have weaker rules and wider variations among firms in corporate governance practices (Mallin, 
2000). The aim of the paper is to study whether companies' corporate governance practices are 
related to its dividend policies in a transition country. The literature suggests that corporate 
governance structures may be related to dividend policy. La Porta et al. (2000) state that firms 
located in countries with higher legal protection (common law system) to minority shareholders pay 
higher dividends, compared to countries where legal protection is weak (civil law system). In our 
opinion Poland with a civil law system offers an interesting setting as an economy in transition that 
has recently entered the EU, for which the dividend determinants still remain scarcely investigated. 
A study on the determinants of dividend policy and its association to corporate governance in a 
transition economy both offers an interesting subject and complements the existing corporate 
governance literature. 
There has been considerable research that seeks to identify the determinants of corporate 
dividend policy. One line of this research has focused on an agency related rationale for paying 
dividends. It is based on the idea that dividends may mitigate agency costs by distributing free cash 
flows that otherwise would be spent on unprofitable projects (Jensen, 1986). Dividends expose 
firms to more frequent inspections by the capital markets as dividend payout increase the likelihood 
of new common stock issue (Easterbrook, 1984). However, this scrutiny helps alleviate 
opportunistic management behavior and thus agency costs, which, in turn, are related to the strength 
of shareholder rights and corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003). In addition, shareholders 
may prefer dividends, particularly when they fear expropriation by insiders. As a consequence, we 
hypothesize that dividend payouts are determined by the strength of corporate governance.    3
In order to measure corporate governance standards, we construct the Transparency 
Disclosure Index (TDI) for listed companies in Poland. The TDI most accurately reflects corporate 
governance policies in Polish companies that differ from the policies in the developed countries as 
well as from the practices in emerging economies. The construction of the sub-indices allows us to 
study particular corporate practices in depth. Our results suggest a positive and significant 
association between dividend payouts and corporate governance practices, indicating that firms pay 
higher dividends if shareholder rights are better protected. These results support the hypothesis that 
in companies providing strong minority shareholder rights, the power is often used to extract 
dividends. Hence, companies with weak shareholder rights pay dividends less generously than do 
firms with high corporate governance standards. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews some previous 
studies on corporate governance and dividend policy. Afterwards we examine the situation of 
corporate governance in Poland. Data discussion is then presented, followed by empirical results 
and robustness checks. The conclusions are given in the final section. 
The Literature on Corporate Governance and Dividend Policies 
  In a pioneering effort, Black (1976) finds no convincing explanation of why companies pay 
cash dividends to their shareholders. Since that introduction of the “dividend puzzle,” a voluminous 
amount of research offers alternative and appealing approaches to solve it. Most of them are rooted 
in information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders, and suggest that firms may 
indicate their future profitability by paying dividends. Grossman and Hart (1980) point out that the 
dividend payouts mitigate agency conflicts by reducing the amount of free cash flow available to 
managers, who do not necessarily act in the best interest of shareholders. Similarly, Jensen (1986) 
argues that a company with substantial free cash flows is inclined to adopt investment projects with 
negative net present values. If managers increase the amount of dividends, ceteris paribus, they also   4
reduce the amount of free cash flows, and mitigate the free cash flow problem. Thus, dividend 
payouts may help control agency problems by getting rid of the excess cash that otherwise could be 
spent on unprofitable projects.  
The importance of monitoring by investment banks has been recognized in literature. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Allen et al. (2000) note that institutional investors prefer to own 
shares of firms making regular dividend payments, and argue that large institutional investors are 
more willing and able to monitor corporate management than are smaller and diffuse owners. As a 
result, corporate dividend policies can be tailored to attract institutional investors, who in turn may 
introduce corporate governance practices. 
La Porta et al. (2002) outline and test two agency models of dividends. First, the outcome 
model suggests that dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to 
disgorge cash. Second, the substitution model predicts that firms with weak shareholder rights need 
to establish a reputation for not exploiting shareholders. Hence, these companies pay dividends 
more generously than do firms with strong shareholder rights. In other words, dividends substitute 
for minority shareholder rights. The empirical results of La Porta et al. (2000) on a cross section 
study of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights 
support the outcome agency model of dividends. Accordingly, it is reasonable that outside minority 
shareholders prefer dividends over retained earnings. In line with that Bebczuk (2005) states that 
the testable prediction of this theoretical body is that dividend disbursements will be the higher the 
better are the corporate governance practices in the company. In this case corporate governance 
reflects the power of minority shareholders in the company. 
The severity of agency costs is likely to be inversely related to the strength of shareholder 
rights (Gompers et al., 2003). Companies exposed to agency conflicts are more likely to experience 
a wider divergence of ownership and control, where shareholder rights are more suppressed. The 
shareholder rights are related to agency problems and thus also to dividend payouts. Therefore, in   5
our paper we hypothesize that dividend policy is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. In 
our opinion, the relationship should be especially strong in Poland, a country in transition, where 
the agency conflicts are strong and the shareholder rights are weak. 
To capture the characteristics of the specific countries and their markets, it is of primary 
importance to construct separate transparency indices.  For instance, Black et al. (2006a) use unique 
features of Korea's corporate governance rules to construct the governance index, while Hussain 
and Mallin (2003) employ a survey methodology to elicit information on corporate governance 
practice in Bahrain. 
In order to estimate the influence of particular governance practices on the amount of 
dividends more accurately, it is necessary to construct a corporate governance measure consisting of 
several sub-indices. Our empirical strategy follows Bebczuk (2005), who splits the general index of 
TDI into several sub-indices and constructs the TDI using public information on 65 non-financial 
public Argentinean companies, reflecting their norms of transparency. His results point to a positive 
effect of the TDI on the amount of dividends, which disappears after controlling for size and 
Tobin’s q. In contrast to Bebczuk (2005), the Polish data shows that corporate governance measures 
are statistically significant even after controlling for plausible firm specific characteristics. Thus, 
our results reveal an existing difference in the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy 
between an emerging country from South America and a Central European transition country.  
Corporate Governance in Poland 
  The Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) was established in 1817, but it was closed for more 
than fifty years due to the Second World War and the introduction of the centrally planned economy 
thereafter. The WSE reopened in 1991 with the first listed companies being four former state-
owned firms. Since that time, the market developed gradually through privatization and the initial 
public offerings (IPOs) of former state-owned companies. The number of public companies with   6
large market capitalization increased and the number of listings exceeded 200 in 1999. Therefore 
the Polish stock market is dominated by large privatized companies. As the privatization was almost 
complete, small and medium sized young private companies began to dominate at the IPO market 
recently. 
  The stock markets in Central Europe leaped into existence before the institutional 
infrastructure was established (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003). As a consequence, the equity listings 
often did not guarantee a transparent share registration, the ability to transfer ownership or the 
absence of manipulation of prices. To make things worse, the market regulations neither required 
any minimum standards of financial disclosure for firms nor promoted competitive activity (Judge 
and Naoumova, 2004). Hence, during the transition period corporate governance standards were 
very weak.  
  Following other stock exchanges in the region the WSE started the implementation of 
corporate governance principles in 2001. At first, a Best Practices Committee, consisting of 
government and industry representatives, was set up with the aim to create the Best Practice Code 
for listed companies. The first Code was presented in the autumn of 2002 and, since then, all listed 
companies could declare if they were going to follow all or just selected rules of the Code. The 
Code was reviewed and amended by the Committee twice. The modifications of the Code were 
made based on the practical experience and recommendations of the European Commission. As of 
August 2006, the declaration on best practiced rules of 2005 was filled by 263 of 268 listed 
companies on the WSE. However, many of those companies that filled the declaration often ignored 
the procedure of the appointment of independent directors in the board of directors. Thus, the Code 
presents only a weak implementation of corporate governance standards in Poland. 
  The development of the stock exchange and the growing share of foreign investors enhanced 
the improvement of the corporate governance standards. Allen et al. (2006) suggest in a study on 
financial development in the EU-25 that introduction of securities laws on the books is remarkable   7
in Central Europe. Using an index they report that the level of investor protection and securities 
markets regulations is comparable to the “old” EU member countries. Thereby, corporate 
governance standards have improved in Poland and it may have an impact on the protection of 
minority shareholders and the dividend payout of listed companies (Koladkiewicz, 2001).  
  Special consideration of the protection of shareholder rights is advocated by various 
institutions such as World Bank and Polish Forum for Corporate Governance (PFCG) that has 
conducted research in the field. The PFCG highlights that Poland has still to implement some of the 
solutions that would safeguard sufficient protection of shareholders. Among the solutions are the 
legal devices that should protect minority interests, improve supervisory board and management 
functioning, and raise corporate transparency. Additionally, World Bank Report on the Observance 
of Standards and Codes (2005) highlights that the major weakness of corporate governance 
practices in Poland is the lack of rules on the approval of related party transactions. The report 
mentions several cases to indicate that minority shareholders may be at risk in companies controlled 
by foreign strategic shareholders, which are interested in pushing down the price in order to take 
private the company cheaply. This accusation is especially powerful as in the last decade the 
majority of going private transactions has been executed by foreign investors (Jackowicz and 
Kowalewski, 2006). A large number of going private transactions may also indicate the existence of 
a potential agency conflict between foreign investors and minority shareholders in Poland.  
  Additionally, with the lack of board independence, many companies are open to potential 
expropriation which, in turn, may create the necessary conditions for the dividend policies well 
explained by the outcome model. Ability to disgorge cash is detrimental to outside shareholders' 
interest, otherwise the excess funds might be diverted or wasted. Taking into account both the 
literature on dividend policies and current situation with the dividends in Poland, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: corporate governance practices have a significant impact on the amount of 
dividends paid out to shareholders in Poland.   8
Data description 
  The financial data comes from the ISI Emerging Market database and the annual reports of 
the companies listed on the WSE. The statistics for the corporate governance index comes from 
annual reports, filings with domestic regulatory agencies, and companies’ websites. The data 
collection for the corporate governance index was completed between August and November 2005. 
We are initially reporting information on corporate governance index on the total 155 listed 
companies as of November 2005. The sample is later substantially reduced because we exclude the 
companies with missing performance or control variables. The final data set for the panel 
regressions consists of 110 listed companies during 1998-2004. In addition, we construct two 
subsamples (1998- 2001 and 2002-2003 sub-periods) to control for the rapid decline of the stock 
markets around the world as well as the economic slowdown in Poland at the end of 2001.  
To test the empirical hypothesis we need appropriate indicators for dividend measure. 
Following the corporate finance literature, we apply the ratio of cash dividends to cash flows as the 
main dividend measure (Faccio et al., 2001). As cash flow is the relevant measure of company’s 
disposable income this ratio captures the choice to distribute the money generated each year to 
shareholders or not. 
The return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q are our main explanatory variables. The former is 
included as an accounting measure that is beyond management manipulation and is calculated as the 
earnings before interest and taxes over total assets. The ratio reflects the availability of resources to 
distribute once investment funding is secured, which increases dividend payments. The latter proxy 
reflects expectations about future earnings and market perceptions about the value of the company. 
Companies’ demand of funds for further investments is represented by a high Tobin’s q value, 
which should have a negative impact on dividends. Following the tradition of the dividend policy 
literature, we also include size and leverage. We anticipate that firm size has a positive effect on the 
dividend payout of a firm. As a rule, large firms are well diversified, and their further growth   9
opportunities are often exhausted. The ratio of long term debt to assets is employed as a measure of 
firm's leverage and closeness to debt covenant restrictions. High leverage and the implied financial 
risk should be associated with lower dividend payout as it discourages both paying out dividends 
and taking further loans. 
Following Black et al. (2006b) and Bebczuk (2005), we employ the TDI to gauge the 
strength of corporate governance practices in listed companies in Poland. The TDI is based on 
public information and reflects the norms of transparency and disclosure in a company. The TDI 
comprises of 32 binary items presented in Table 1, which cover a broad range of corporate 
governance topics. The binary item equals one if a company follows one of the corporate 
governance standards and zero otherwise. The TDI consists of three subindices: Board, Disclosure 
and Shareholders. The subindex Board measures the structure, procedures and compensation of 
board and top management members. The subindex Disclosure measures the degree to which the 
company informs relevant corporate facts to outside stakeholders. The last subindex Shareholders 
measures the quality of information regarding the compensation to minority shareholders. Table 1 
shows the percentage of positive entries for the TDI and its three subindices. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The econometric specifications also include industry and time dummies. Taking into 
account the importance of industry effects on companies’ performance, firms are classified into 
three broad sectors: industry, services and primary products. They all vary in productive technology 
and international tradability. 
Empirical Implementation 
Our research strategy is based on identifying fundamental determinants that explain cash 
dividends to cash flow ratios’ in relation with our corporate governance measures. We estimate 
pooled Tobit regression model similar to the study of Bebczuk (2005). This empirical methodology   10
is applied as the dependent variable is truncated at zero and it has numerous individual observations 
displaying such value in our sample. Our sample consists of 110 non-financial publicly listed 
companies with 760 observations over 1998-2004. It is also divided into two sub-samples: 1998-
2001 and 2002-2004.  
The descriptive statistics for our corporate governance measures are presented in Panel A of 
Table 2. The mean of TDI (0.41) illustrates that the corporate governance standards are on average 
relatively low in the listed companies. Two of the three subindices of the TDI are surprisingly low. 
The subindex Shareholders is quite low at 0.35, and the subindex Board is even lower with a value 
of 0.32. The subindex Disclosure, with a value of 0.51, is the highest among the three subindices. 
The subindices present large variation in corporate governance standards across listed companies in 
our sample. The high value of the TDI subindex Disclosure reflects good corporate governance 
practices in informing the shareholder, and the low value of the two other subindices indicate 
relatively low standards regarding management, board and minority shareholders protection. 
  Panel B of Table 2 shows that the average firm in our sample has corporate assets of 626 
million PLN ($210 million). The mean dividend payout ratio to cash flow is 0.05. Also, the 
dividends to earnings and dividends to sales present a large variation across companies. The mean 
value for this payout ratios are 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. Most listed companies in our sample are 
from the industry sector, followed by service sector, while firms from the primary industry sector 
are the least present. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We split our sample of listed companies into dividend payers and non-dividend payers to 
test whether means are different. Table 3 reports the mean value of the main variable of interests for 
dividend payers and non-dividend payers firms. The comparison supports our hypothesis on 
association of dividend policy and corporate governance. Dividend-paying companies are on 
average larger, more profitable and less levered than non-dividend-paying. The average difference   11
between dividend payers and non-dividend payers companies is significantly different at 1 per cent 
level.  
Panel B of Table 3 presents that dividend-paying companies have better corporate 
governance as estimated by the TDI and its subindices. The results are significant at 1 per cent 
confidence level and present the expected differences across listed companies in our sample. The 
considerable differences in the variables support our assumption that financial determinants as well 
as corporate governance standards may have an impact on the dividend policy of a company. 
Differences in means are statistically significant for all the variables, except Tobin's q, yet this 
variable should be negatively associated with dividend payout ratio. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  We test the association of corporate governance with dividend policy in a multiple 
regression framework to control for firm specific characteristics other than governance. The results 
of a regression analysis for pooled Tobit are shown in Table 4. We regress dividend payout to cash 
flow ratio against the TDI. The governance index captures the impact of the strength of shareholder 
rights on dividend policy. We also add our set of control variables that determine the dividend 
policy, showing the results with a partial set of control variables in specifications (2)-(5).  
  The TDI is highly significant in each of these regressions. Adding control variables does not 
change significantly the coefficient of the TDI. Regression (1) implies that an increase in corporate 
governance index by one point results in an increase of dividend-to-cash flow by 0.91 points.  The 
regressions (2)-(5) present a worst-to-best change in the TDI from 0.69 to 1.02. Size and return on 
assets are positively associated with the variable cash dividends to cash flow at 1 per cent 
significance level. Leverage is negatively associated with the variable cash dividends to cash flow 
at 1 per cent significance level but Tobin's q variable is not statistically significant. The dummy 
variables are included only to control for potential industry and year effects. Sectors' dummies   12
variables are statistically significant in four regression models. Nonetheless, primary products 
sector dummy never enters the specification significantly. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In addition, we regress dividend-to-cash flow on the TDI and the three subindices that 
comprise the index: Board, Disclosure and Shareholders. The results of pooled Tobit regression for 
the whole period 1998-2004 and the two subperiods 1998-2001 and 2002-2004 are shown in Table 
5. All the regressions include time and sector dummies. 
In all the regressions the TDI and each individual TDI subindex is statistically significant. 
The strongest results are for the TDI subindices Board, Disclosure and Shareholder, in that order. 
The coefficient of 0.86 on subindex TDI Disclosure, for example, implies that the improvement in 
corporate governance practice concerning disclosure in the years 1998-2004 by 1 point predicts a 
0.86 points increase of dividends-to-cash flow ratio. Our results show significant differences in 
results between two subperiods. We observe that the relationship has sizeable effects for both 
subperiods: for the first from 1998 to 2001 and for the second from 2002 to 2004. The TDI of 
corporate governance measure is a valid measure of minority shareholder protection and thus also 
dividend payout ratio in throughout our sample period. Its prediction power is not getting weaker 
because of the implementation of corporate standards across listed companies in Poland. The TDI 
remain statistically significant at 1 per cent or 5 per cent level and thus the results present a strong 
correlation between dividend payout and companies’ corporate governance. This implies that the 
elements of the corporate governance index have more predictive power when aggregated into an 
index than individually. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  We next conduct a number of robustness tests. We test the sensitivity of the results to a 
number of alternative specifications of our regression
1. First, we check the consistency of the results   13
after removing outliers. These outliers are eliminated after considering the scatter plot of the 
dividend payout regressions involving corporate governance measure. We eliminate those 
companies that fall particularly far from the regression line and then repeat the estimation on the 
new sample. After dropping out the extreme observations we still get a significant and positive 
relationship between corporate governance practice and dividend payout. 
  Second, there are not many ways of measuring the variables that enter the regression. 
Nevertheless, as we want to ensure that the results are not due to our choice of indicators, we 
perform a number of robustness tests using alternative measures for dividend payout and corporate 
governance practice. We repeat the regressions reported in this paper using an alternative measure 
for the dividend payout ratio. The new ratio was defined as dividends to earnings or dividends to 
sales. In both cases, the pooled Tobit results are qualitatively the same as those previously reported. 
The TDI and its subindices were significantly and positively associated with the alternative 
dividend payout ratios. 
We also run a regression using an alternative index for corporate governance practice. We 
employed the Polish Corporate Governance Rating for 50 listed companies instead of the TDI. The 
coefficient was still positive, yet the results were weaker. As an alternative index for corporate 
governance practice we have also employed a variable, which reflects the number of rules followed 
by the listed companies from the WSE Best Practice Code. In this case the coefficient was relatively 
small and not statistically significant. Therefore, in our opinion, the Best Practice Code may not be 
used as a proxy for corporate governance practice. We also compute the regressions changing ratios 
for both the dependent variable and the main regressor, using the Polish Corporate Governance 
Rating, and in either case the signs of the estimated coefficients have not changed. 
  Finally, changing the conditioning information set has not affected our results. Further 
increasing the set of explanatory variables included in the regressions with the sales’ growth, 
company's age and dummy variables for foreign ownership or for GDRs, does not change either the   14
significance level or the sign of the estimated coefficients. Concluding, the results of the sensitivity 
test using a different set of data remain unaffected by an array of robustness checks and confirm our 
previous finding on the link between corporate governance practice and dividend payout. 
Conclusions 
   Our empirical results demonstrate that corporate governance is an important determinant in 
explaining the dividend policy of listed companies in Poland. To measure the quality of corporate 
governance, we construct the Transparency Disclosure Index for 110 companies listed on the WSE. 
In line with our predictions, and controlling for other factors, we find strong positive correlation 
between the overall TDI and dividend payout, which is robust across different  regression 
specifications and time subsamples. Our measure for corporate governance, the TDI, and its 
subindices enter positively and significantly the regressions. For the whole period 1998-2004, one 
point increase of the TDI, the subindex of Board, the subindex Disclosure, the subindex 
Shareholders brings about an increase of 45.32, 26.93, 36.93, and 21.41 points respectively in the 
dividend-to-cash flow ratio. 
  Our results for the remaining potential dividend determinants are in line with the corporate 
finance literature and expectations. We find that larger companies by asset size and more profitable 
firms without good investment opportunities pay more dividends.  Furthermore, riskier and more 
indebted firms prefer to pay lower dividends. 
  Concluding, our results provide evidence that listed companies in Poland where corporate 
governance practice are high and as a consequence shareholder rights are strong payout higher 
dividends. Those results are in line with the outcome model assuming that when shareholders have 
greater rights, they can use their power to influence dividend policy. This study contributes to the 
literature both in dividend policy and in agency theory. In dividend policy, we show that corporate 
governance is a significant determinant of dividend policy in transition countries. In agency theory,   15
this study presents that in companies with strong corporate governance standards the agency 
conflict may be mitigated as the free cash flow may be utilized rather as dividend than an 
investment with a negative net present value.   16
References  
Allen, F., Bernardo, A. and Welch, I. (2000) A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles, 
Journal of Finance, 55, 2499-2536. 
Allen, F., Bartiloro, L. and Kowalewski, O. (2006) The Financial System of the EU 25. In   
Liebscher, K., Christl, J. and Mooslechner, P. (eds.), Financial Development, Integration and 
Stability in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Bebczuk, R. (2005) Corporate Governance and Ownership: Measurement and Impact on Corporate 
Performance and Dividend Policies in Argentina, Center for Financial Stability, Working Paper. 
Black, F. (1976) The Dividend Puzzle, Journal of Portfolio Management, 2, 5-8. 
Black, B., Jang, H. and Kim, W. (2006a) Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market 
Values?: Evidence from Korea, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22 (2), 366-413. 
Black, B., Jang, H. and Kim, W. (2006b) Predicting Firms' Corporate Governance Choices: 
Evidence from Korea, Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (3), 660-691. 
Bonin, J. and Wachtel, P. (2003) Financial Sector Development in Transition Economies: Lessons 
from the First Decade, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 12 (1), 1-66. 
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984) Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, American Economic 
Review, 74, 650-659. 
Faccio, M., Lang, L. and Young, L. (2001) Dividends and Expropriation, American Economic 
Review, 91 (1), 54-78. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J. L. and Metrick, A. (2003) Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118, 107-155. 
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1980) Disclosure Laws and Take-over Bids, Journal of Finance, 35, 
323-334. 
Hussain, S. H. and Mallin, C. (2003) The Dynamics of Corporate Governance in Bahrain: Structure, 
Responsibilities and Operation of Corporate Boards, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 11, 249-261. 
Jackowicz, K. and Kowalewski, O. (2006) Why Do Companies Go Private in Emerging Markets? 
Evidence from Poland, The Journal for East European Management Studies, 11(4), 328 – 350.   17
Jensen, M. (1986) Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, American 
Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
Johnson, S. H., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2000) Tunnelling, NBER 
Working Paper No. W7523. 
Judge, W. and Naoumova, I. (2004) Corporate Governance in Russia: What Model Will It Follow?  
Corporate Governance: An International Review 12 (3), 302–313. 
Koladkiewicz, I. (2001) Building of a Corporate Governance System in Poland: Initial Experiences  
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9 (3), 228–237. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2000) Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (1-2), 3-27. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2002) Agency Problems and 
Dividend Policies Around the World, Journal of Finance, 55 (1), 1-33. 
Mallin C., (2000) Developments in Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 8 (1), 43-51.   
Shleifer, A., Vishny R. (1986) Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political 
Economy, 94, 461-488. 
 
                                                 
1 The results of robustness analysis are not reported but are available upon request.   18
Table 1 
Structure of the Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) 
 
The TDI measures a broad set of corporate governance features for 154 listed firms in Poland using public 
information in August 2005 to November 2005. Public sources include annual reports, filings with national 
regulators, internet sources, and business publications. For each feature, the company is given a value 1 if 
there is partial or total public information and 0 otherwise. The subindex Board measures the structure, 
procedures and compensation of Board and Top Management members. The subindex Disclosure 
measures the degree to which the company informs relevant corporate facts to outside stakeholders. Finally, 





% of firms with public 
information on each item 
A. Board structure and procedures (TDI-Board)   
Independency criteria for directors  22.08 
Years in office of present Directors  23.38 
Code of Conduct for Directors  74.68 
Manager and director fees  70.78 
Form of manager and director fee payment (cash, stock, stock options)  51.30 
Rationale of manager and director fees  34.42 
Information on whether manager and director fees are performance-based  38.96 
Shareholdings of managers and directors  74.03 
Number and percentage of independent directors  24.68 
Details on the nomination process of new directors  1.30 
Report on issues by dissident directors  0.00 
Composition of the different Board committees  6.49 
Details on activities of the different Board committees  1.30 
   
B. Disclosure (TDI-Disclosure)   
Bio of main company officers  34.42 
Bio of Directors  27.92 
Calendar of future events  41.56 
English-translated corporate website  85.71 
Financial indicators for the last 5 years  81.82 
Strategic plan and projections for the following years  29.87 
Publication of Board meeting resolutions  94.16 
Publication of shareholders meeting resolutions  94.81 
Details on the appointment process of new directors  0.65 
Details on attendance of minority and controlling shareholders in 
shareholders' meetings  1.30 
Reports on issues raised by dissident shareholders  0.00 
Year of hiring of the external auditor  97.40 
Report of the external auditor  97.40 
   
C. Shareholders (TDI-Shareholders)   
Details of corporate ownership (principal shareholders)  94.81 
Type and amount of outstanding shares  89.61 
Document on internal corporate governance standards  1.30 
Dividend policy in the past 5 years  18.83 
Projected dividend policy for the following years  7.14 
Rationale of the past and/or future dividend policy  11.04 
Source: Own elaboration from public sources.   19
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of the corporate governance 





Definitions Mean  Std.  Dev. 
 
Panel A: Corporate Governance Index  
 
TDI  Transparency and Disclosure Index  0.406  0.134 
TDI- Board  Board structure and procedures  0.322  0.189 
TDI- Disclosure  Disclosure  0.513  0.152 
TDI- Shareholder  Shareholders  0.355  0.159 
 
Panel B:  Performance and Control Variables 
 
ROA  Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets  0.020  0.132 
Tobin's q  Market value of equity plus the book value of 
liabilities to book value of assets  1.417 2.420 
Dividends to cash flow   Cash dividends to total earnings plus 
depreciation  0.053  0.409 
Dividends to earnings  Cash dividends to total earnings  0.096  0.673 
Dividends to sales  Cash dividends to sales  0.014  0.166 
Assets  The company’s total assets  625 620  3 038 420 
Debt to Assets  Total debt to assets  0.517  0.389 
Primary Dummy 
This variable takes the value 1 if the company 
produces agricultural products, livestock, 
minerals, or other commodities, and 0 otherwise. 
The activity classification is taken from the NACE. 
0.164 0.370 
Industry Dummy 
This variable takes the value 1 if the company 
belongs to the industrial sector, and 0 otherwise. 
The activity classification is taken from the NACE 
0.627 0.484 
Services Dummy 
This variable takes the value 1 if the company 
provides services or supplies utilities, and 0 
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Table 3 
Mean difference tests  
 
Table shows the means of the balance sheet variables used in the estimation and broken down into dividend 






Dividend Payers  Difference P-value 
 
Panel A: Balance Sheet Variables 
 
Ln(Assets)   11.600  12.061  -0.462  0.000 
ROA   -0.004  0.073  -0.076  0.000 
Tobin's q   1.407  1.438  -0.031  0.872 
Debt to assets   0.584  0.365  0.220  0.000 
 
Panel B: TDI Indices 
 
TDI 0.392  0.433  -0.041  0.000 
TDI-Board 0.309  0.351  -0.042  0.005 
TDI-Disclosure 0.498  0.540  -0.041  0.001 
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Table 4 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow: TDI and Balance Sheet Determinants 
 
Pooled Tobit results for yearly data 1998-2004 and a maximum of 110 non-financial listed firms. The yearly 
cash dividends are those announced once the company's fiscal year has ended, and the accounting 
variables are calculated from such fiscal year's statements. Observations with percentage ROA smaller than 
-20 and higher than 20 are dropped. The TDI (on a 0-100 scale) is the same for all periods, and is based on 
public corporate information for 2005. For each regression the controls are time and sector dummies (not 
reported).  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Constant -0.890***  -1.333***  -1.081*** -0.878***  -0.277* 
  (0.161) (0.321) (0.163) (0.161) (0.157) 
TDI 0.907***  0.685**  0.689***  0.928***  1.015*** 
  (0.243) (0.277) (0.233) (0.245) (0.237) 
Ln(Assets)   0.045       
   (0.027)      
ROA     3.472***    
     (0.464)     
Tobin's  q      0.001   
      (0.014)   
Debt  to  Assets       -1.515*** 
       (0.180) 
Industry  dummy  0.281*** 0.298*** 0.293*** 0.278***  0.159* 
  (0.088) (0.090) (0.086) (0.088) (0.084) 
Primary product dummy  0.026  0.029  0.085  0.017  0.004 
  (0.117) (0.118) (0.113) (0.117) (0.113) 
Observations  765 765 765 757 765 
Chi2 37.011  39.724  117.189  38.622  137.238 
Obs. left-censored at 
zero 
570 570 570 562 570 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 5 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow and TDI 
 
Each line of Table displays, for the whole period (1998-2004) and two subperiods (1998-2001 and 2002-
2004), the estimated coefficient (and robust t statistic) on alternative TDI measures, namely, the three 
subindices defined in the text (Board, Disclosure, Shareholders) - each measured, as the TDI, on a 0-100 
scale, the principal component of these three subindices, and the median overall TDI. For each pooled Tobit 
regression, the controls are time and sector dummies. 
 
  Tobit 1  Tobit 2  Tobit 3 
 (1998-2004)  (1998-2001)  (2001-2004) 
TDI  0.907*** 0.781** 1.077*** 
 (0.243)  (0.304)  (0.406) 
TDI-Board 0.458***  0.276  0.741** 
 (0.171)  (0.211)  (0.293) 
TDI-Disclosure 0.855***  0.996***  0.639* 
 (0.228)  (0.297)  (0.366) 
TDI-Shareholders 0.471**  0.340  0.672** 
 (0.199)  (0.245)  (0.341) 
TDI-Principal  component  0.087*** 0.074** 0.106*** 
 (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.040) 
TDI-Median 0.270***  0.228**    0.328*** 
  (0.074)     (0.092)     (0.125)    
 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 